Kooistra Autogroep |
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Management Control Systems |
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Organizational Behavior |
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Intermediate |
8 |
Available.
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$9.00
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When he took over as CEO of the Kooistra Autogroep in 2002, Tom
Kooistra made significant changes to his company's management control
system. Most significantly, he decentralized decision-making authority,
developed a performance reporting system that included both financial
and nonfinancial information, and introduced a pay-for-performance
system for the company's dealership and department managers. Tom
explained:
My father had been running this company like a family, but we've become
too big to operate like this. Besides, we need to be more competitive
to survive. That's why I am so keen on implementing the new
pay-for-performance plan. With decentralization comes accountability
for performance. If our people are willing to accept that
accountability, then I am quite willing to share with them a fair
proportion of the company's success.
But while the company's managers seemed to value the increased
authority and performance-related information, their feelings regarding
the pay-for-performance system were mixed. In 2007, Tom was considering
whether he should try to reinforce the system by telling the managers
that the system was here to stay and that they needed to learn how to
make it work, or whether he should revise, or possibly even abandon,
the system.
THE COMPANY
Kooistra Autogroep was a family owned automobile retailing company
founded in 1953. Over the years, Kooistra grew from a small company
that sold and serviced cars of only one or two brands from a single
location to a top-20 player in the Dutch car dealership market. In
early 2007, it owned and operated 13 dealership locations selling 10
brands of automobiles and employed approximately 325 people.
The Kooistra dealerships were located in the city of Tilburg and in
smaller surrounding towns in the southern part of the Netherlands.
Kooistra owned five Opel dealerships, three Toyota dealerships, one
Citroën dealership, one Suzuki dealership, one Saab dealership, one
Alfa Romeo dealership, and one combined Chevrolet, Cadillac, Corvette,
and Hummer dealership. Opel (a brand of General Motors) had been the
market leader in the Netherlands since the 1970s, with a market share
of almost 10% in 2006. Toyota was the sixth largest brand, with a 7%
market share. Citroën had a market share of 4% and Suzuki and Chevrolet
had market shares of about 2-3%. The other brands sold by
Kooistra-Saab, Alfa Romeo, Cadillac, Corvette, and Hummer-all had
market shares of less than 1%. For these smaller brands, the nearest
competing dealership was typically located far away. In addition to the
car dealerships, the Kooistra Autogroep also owned a body repair shop
and a car lease company.
Assignment
1. Did Kooistra Autogroep management go too far in
decentralizing the organization? Did they not go far enough? Or did
they get it just right? Why?
2. Evaluate the budgeting, performance measurement,
and incentive systems used at Kooistra Autogroep. What changes would
you recommend, if any?
3. (When used in conjunction with Puente Hills
Toyota.) When comparing the use of incentives in the Puente Hills
Toyota and Kooistra Autogroep cases, do you believe that incentive pay
is truly effort-inducing; that is, drive employees to perform at their
best? If you believe incentive pay is not, in whole or part, effective
in making employees work harder, then what other po-tenurially useful
purposes does variable incentive pay provide for organizations relying
on it, if any?
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